{"id":94,"date":"2007-11-30T02:12:31","date_gmt":"2007-11-30T01:12:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/?p=94"},"modified":"2007-11-30T02:12:31","modified_gmt":"2007-11-30T01:12:31","slug":"the-individual-unit-in-the-network-as-far-as-speech-generation-is-concerned-is-a-word-pair","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/2007\/11\/30\/the-individual-unit-in-the-network-as-far-as-speech-generation-is-concerned-is-a-word-pair\/","title":{"rendered":"The individual unit in the network as far as speech generation is concerned is a word-pair"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Thought as word dynamics. II. Architecture (5)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Mathematically speaking, a graph is a set of ordered pairs. It can be decomposed in elementary units of individual pairs. Each of the two elements in an ordered pair represents a <em>node<\/em> in the graph and every pair represents an <em>edge<\/em>. Say, there are four nodes, A, B, C and D and the graph is defined as (a, b), (b, c), (c, d) and (a, c), the corresponding graph is as represented in the figure below.<br \/>\n<a href='http:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2007\/11\/graph.bmp' title='Graph'><img src='http:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2007\/11\/graph.bmp' alt='Graph' \/><\/a><br \/>\nAn example of a word-pair is \u201ccat-feline\u201d and each of the two words \u201ccat\u201d and \u201cfeline,\u201d can be part of more than one of such pairs: \u201cfeline\u201d may be associated again, this time with \u201cmammal,\u201d and \u201ccat\u201d with \u201cwhiskers,\u201d etc. The individual units of the network we\u2019re talking about here are two nodes associated and standing for \u201cword-pairs.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The origin of the medieval notion of the \u201ccategoreme\u201d introduced in Section 4 rests in Aristotle\u2019s short treatise called \u201cCategories\u201d devoted to those words that can act as either a <em>subject<\/em> or a <em>predicate<\/em> in a sentence. \u201cBlue\u201d is <em>predicated<\/em> of the subject \u201cviolets\u201d when I say that \u201cviolets are blue.\u201d Color\u201d is <em>predicated<\/em> of \u201cblue,\u201d the subject, when I say that \u201cBlue is a color.\u201d It is clear that the words so distinguished as being able to act either as <em>subject<\/em> or as <em>predicate<\/em> amount to those I called in Section 4 \u201ccontent-words.\u201d Why call them then \u201ccategoremes\u201d? Because, Aristotle argues, they can be used in ten different ways, acting in ten different functions, being also the ten standpoints from which \u201cstuffs\u201d can be envisaged. These are the \u201cvarious meanings of being\u201d which he calls the <em>categories<\/em>. <\/p>\n<p>Here is his explanation of this in his own terms: \u201cExpressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are \u2018man\u2019 or \u2018the horse\u2019, of quantity, such terms as \u2018two cubits long\u2019 or \u2018three cubits long\u2019, of quality, such attributes as \u2018white\u2019, \u2018grammatical\u2019. \u2018Double\u2019, \u2018half\u2019, \u2018greater\u2019, fall under the category of relation; \u2018at the market place\u2019, \u2018in the Lyceum\u2019, under that of place; \u2018yesterday\u2019, \u2018last year\u2019, under that of time. \u2018Lying\u2019, \u2018sitting\u2019, are terms indicating position, \u2018shod\u2019, \u2018armed\u2019, state; \u2018to lance\u2019, \u2018to cauterize\u2019, action; \u2018to be lanced\u2019, \u2018to be cauterized\u2019, affection. No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as \u2018man\u2019, \u2018white\u2019, \u2018runs\u2019, \u2018wins\u2019, cannot be either true or false\u201d (Aristotle, Categories, IV).<\/p>\n<p>The final words in the passage just quoted are most important: isolated terms, terms taken on their own cannot be regarded as either true or false: \u201cit is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise.\u201d It is possible to even go one step further: does a term in isolation <em>mean<\/em> anything? \u201cOf course\u201d is one tempted to say, indeed, as I said earlier, we\u2019re at no loss when asked to define a term like \u201crose.\u201d I gave as an example of doing precisely that: \u201ca rose is a flower that has many petals, often pink, a strong and very pleasant fragrance, a thorny stem.\u201d We spontaneously assigned to the rose the category of <em>substance<\/em>, of being a flower; we assigned <em>quantity<\/em> to its petals for being many; we attributed the <em>quality<\/em> of being pink to its petals, etc. In other words, we brought the rose out of its isolation by connecting it with other words in sentences of which, as Aristotle observed, it will then be possible to say if they are true or false. <\/p>\n<p>Out of the examples the Greek philosopher mentions, it is self-evident that \u201cdouble,\u201d \u201chalf,\u201d \u201cgreater,\u201d \u201ctwo cubits long,\u201d \u201clying,\u201d \u201csitting,\u201d \u201cshod,\u201d \u201carmed,\u201d \u201cruns,\u201d \u201cwins\u201d have no meaning unless they are said \u2013 <em>predicated<\/em> \u2013 of something else. But with a moment of reflection it becomes obvious that this applies to the other words too: \u201cman,\u201d \u201chorse,\u201d \u201cwhite.\u201d As we\u2019ve just seen when examining what is called the <em>definition<\/em> of a rose, these words also need to be said of something to come alive. In a passage of one of his dialogues, <em>The Sophist<\/em>, Plato has the Stranger from Elea (*) make an identical point: \u201cThe Stranger: A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns. [&#8230;] a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse. [&#8230;] I mean that words like \u2018walks,\u2019 \u2018runs,\u2019 \u2018sleeps,\u2019 or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse. [&#8230;] Or, again, when you say \u2018lion,\u2019 \u2018stag,\u2019 \u2018horse,\u2019 or any other words which denote agent \u2013 neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; [&#8230;] When any one says \u2018A man learns,\u2019 should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences? [&#8230;] And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse\u201d (Plato, <em>The Sophist<\/em>).<\/p>\n<p>Assuming that there is in the brain a network being the substrate for speech performance, what would then be the \u201celement\u201d \u2013 the smallest unit \u2013 to be stored in such a network? I hold that it would be the \u201cword-pairs\u201d just described, instead of words in isolation. Synaptic connections seem the perfect locus for such storage: the place where the building blocks of the brain\u2019s biological network, the neurons, come together. Why not the isolated word? Because, as Aristotle saw it sagaciously, \u201cword-pairs\u201d are true or false and, as we will see next, something being true or false is the first condition for it having an affective value, i.e. what brings in motion the dynamics of speech performance.\t<\/p>\n<p>(*) Griswold notices that \u2013 apart from Parmenides \u2013 the anonymous stranger is the single figure in all the dialogues who speaks like a full-blown philosopher; he observes also that while Socrates is present in the Sophist he remains almost mute (Charles L. Griswold, \u201cLa naissance et la d\u00e9fense de la raison dialogique chez Platon,\u201d in <em>La naissance de la raison en Gr\u00e8ce<\/em>, Paris: PUF, 1990: p. 365)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Thought as word dynamics. II. Architecture (5)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Mathematically speaking, a graph is a set of ordered pairs. It can be decomposed in elementary units of individual pairs. Each of the two elements in an ordered pair represents a <em>node<\/em> in the graph and every pair represents an <em>edge<\/em>. Say, there are four nodes, A, B, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-94","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-artificial-intelligence"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/94","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=94"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/94\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=94"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=94"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pauljorion.com\/blog_en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=94"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}